The canonical principal-agent problem involves a risk-neutral principal who must use incentives to motivate a risk-averse agent to take a costly, unobservable action that improves the principal's payoff. The standard solution requires an inefficient shifting of risk to the agent. This paper summarizes some experimental research that throws doubt on the validity of this conclusion. Experimental subjects were routinely able to achieve efficiency in agent effort levels without inefficient risk-sharing. This is precisely the kind of efficient outcome that principalagency theory says is unavailable.
IN PRINCIPAL-AGENT NEGOTIATIONS
More than half a century ago, Berle and Means (1932) argued that many diffuse shareholders could not hope to constrain corporate managers to act in the shareholders' interest.
Corporate managers were, therefore, free to pursue their own interests. Since the interests of managers were quite distinct from those of shareholders, managers were presumably free to use the resources of the firm in their own interests. The legal rights of the stockholders were not matched, they argued, by effective control of the firm.
Not coincidentally, Berle and Means wrote at the dawn of the New Deal, a period in which the evolving power of unelected federal bureaucrats raised similar concerns about managerial accountability in the public sphere. The problem of public bureaucratic accountability was in some ways analogous to that of private managerial accountability. The legal rights of citizens in a democracy are held by a large diffuse constituency; the necessity of energetic and effective management of large organizations seemed at times to create a real mismatch between citizenship (or ownership) and control of the organizational infrastructure of the state (or firm).
In the 1970s, concern with the problem of corporate accountability generated a body of research known as principal-agency theory (Fama 1980; Mirrlees 1976; Ross 1973; Shavell 1979) . This literature recognizes an information asymmetry. Shareholders (the principal) cannot monitor corporate managers directly; therefore, they need to induce an agent to take costly actions in the interests of the principal, without monitoring. The early literature found that, despite the information asymmetry, principals could find an optimal (second-best) solution that induces the greatest possible agent effort even though the principal can never directly observe the effort.
As popularly interpreted, the message of principal-agency theory has been that Berle and Means underestimated the ability of principals to shape agents' behavior; in the presence of an information asymmetry, a principal may use incentives to control the behavior of subordinates.
In academics, this has caused an explosion of research on incentive contracts for corporate managers, sales staff, and all other positions in the firm (Milgrom and Roberts 1992) . It has also fueled an expansion in the use of such incentives in the world of corporate America.
Principal-agency theory has had enormous influence in the study of public agencies as well as private firms. Part of the attraction has been the use of principal-agency theory to study accountability in hierarchical relationships where monitoring costs make direct control infeasible. For example, the literature on congressional oversight of bureaucracy had traditionally lamented the scarcity of direct monitoring by congressional committees, and Fiorina (1981) had lamented a "Mismatch of Incentives and Capabilities" in congressional control of the bureaucracy. However, Weingast (1984) used principal-agency theory to argue that Congress's lack of direct oversight could be a manifestation of effective use of incentives, which allow Congress to control agencies without expensive oversight procedures.
The purpose of this paper is to re-examine canonical principal-agency theory and its implications for public bureaucracy. We argue that the primary message is really a negative one -the costs of using incentives are easily prohibitive of efficient outcomes. We further argue that in the case of public bureaucracy the costs of using incentives are likely to be high. We also argue that empirical research on the canonical principal-agency problem casts doubt on the predictive power of the theory, and that those doubts are again especially applicable in the case of public bureaucracy. Furthermore, there are theoretical reasons to believe that even if we could principal-agency problems, as classically defined, we would be worse off because principals themselves must be the source of moral hazard in the larger constitutional system. Because of these issues, the concentration on incentive plans as a solution to the problems facing private and public bureaucracies is misplaced. The real concern should be on traditional concerns of the public administration literature: internal motivation, selection, organization, and bureaucratic politics.
In the next section, we review the implicit tradeoff between insurance and incentives in principal-agency relationships. The following section addresses an experiment meant to test the principal-agency solution to this tradeoff. We then turn first to reciprocity and the value of gift exchanges in these relationships, and second to the crowding out of these exchanges with the recent emphasis on incentives. Last we offer a set of illustrations of the power of reciprocity in work environments, with special emphasis on public management.
INSURANCE VERSUS INCENTIVES: THE LESSONS OF PRINCIPAL-AGENCY
The agent has his own interests at heart, and is induced to pursue the principal's objectives only to the extent that the incentive structure imposed in their contract renders such behavior advantageous. The essence of the principal's problem is the design of just such an incentive structure (Moe, 1983, 756 ).
The basic principal-agency problem is very simple. There is one principal and one agent.
The principal can not observe the agent's efforts, but can clearly measure outcomes that affect her wellbeing -in fact there is only one outcome that matters. In Dixit and Nalebuff's highly accessible illustration, that outcome is the success or failure of the principal's computer game (1991) .
If the outcome in question were dependent only on the agent's actions, then the principal could work backwards from the observed outcome to deduce the agent's actions. For example, if the computer program's success were completely determined by the sales agent's efforts, then failure could only be caused by low effort. This deducibility makes the principal's problem just as trivial as if the agent's actions were directly observable: pay the agent only for the desired outcome. In this case, there would be no control loss by the principal. The outcome would be perfectly efficient, and the principal could extract all the profits from the program beyond the agent's opportunity cost (which would be determined by the market for the agent's labor).
But in general, the outcome is determined in part by some exogenous factor that appears as a random variable in the production function. In the example above, the success of the computer game is normally determined in large part by a random variable known as demand, which is the result of the economy, shifting tastes, changing technologies, the prices of other substitute and complement goods, all of which are out of the control of the sales agent. This random variable creates variability, or risk, in the outcome, and in the principal's wellbeing.
It is possible, even with the risky component of success, for the outcome to be efficient and the principal to extract all the profits less the agent's opportunity cost. Assume that the principal and the agent are assumed to be risk-neutral. If the program turns out to be a success, it will generate $200,000 in revenue. The chances for success depend on the effort of the computer programmer. The programmer could apply either a routine or high effort. A routine effort would cost the programmer $50,000 worth of effort cost, and create a P = 60% chance of success. If the programmer put in a supreme effort, the effort cost would increase to $70,000, and the chance of success would increase to Q = 80%.
Assuming rationality on the part of the programmer, he must be compensated for the difference in effort cost between a routine and high effort (which we will call) E. A flat wage cannot provide the motivation to take the high effort, because the flat wage would by definition be paid whether or not the programmer supplies the high effort.
Consequently, the owner must pay the programmer an outcome-dependent (and therefore risky) bonus B. The bonus will be paid in the event of a success even if the programmer shirked.
And it will not be paid in the event of a failure, even if the programmer provided a high effort.
As a result, a risk-neutral programmer will pay the additional effort cost E only if the expected value is greater than the expected value of providing low effort. The expected payoff for high effort is QB + E, while the expected payoff for low effort is PB. If QB -E > PB, then it will be worthwhile for the programmer to provide the additional effort. This condition can be restated as requiring B > E/(Q-P).
We can think of Q-P as a measure of efficacy. If Q-P were equal to one, then the effect of the random variable would be zero, and the bonus need only cover the marginal effort cost to induce a high effort. If Q-P is small, it means that the agent has little impact on the probability of success, and B must be potentially much larger than the effort cost to induce effort. For our example, the necessary bonus that solves the principal's problem is equal to $20,000/0.2, or $100,000. In other words, a 20% increase in the probability of getting a bonus of $100,000 just compensates the programmer for an extra $20,000 in effort cost. Any bonus less than $100,000, in Dixit and Nalebuff's example and in our subsequent experiments, should be insufficient to justify a high level of effort by the subordinate.
If the agent and the principal were both risk-neutral, a bonus payment of $100,000 would completely compensate for the information asymmetry. That is, with a bonus of $100,000, the owner could be just as confident she was getting a high effort level from her programmer as if she were observing it directly. As Dixit and Nalebuff point out, this means that the risk-neutral agent must have in effect a 50% ownership stake in the firm in order to guarantee high effort.
For this 50% ownership, the principal could even charge the agent $10,000, plus his labor. The expected payoff ($70,000 = $100,000 * 80%) less than $10,000 upfront charge to the agent, would be exactly comparable to a flat wage of $70,000, and would just compensate the agent for the cost of supplying a high effort. Thus, there would be no efficiency loss due to the information asymmetry, and no loss of profit to the owner. This is the solution to the principal's problem.
As Dixit and Nalebuff point out, this example demonstrates that the information asymmetry in the agent's favor need not generate inefficiency, and the owner could expect the same level of profits as if she could monitor the effort level directly: "The incentive system has done a perfect job; the unobservability of effort hasn't made any difference" (305). This message, that incentives can efficiently counteract information asymmetry, is often the message that is carried over to public administration. However, as principal-agency theorists are careful to note, there is an efficiency loss due to the combination of information asymmetry and risk aversion.
Risk Aversion
Risk neutrality on the part of the principal is a reasonable assumption. After all, every American capitalist has the efficiency of the capital market on which to manage risk efficiently and to hedge against particularly threatening risks. In particular, the owner of the new computer game idea may have many possible investment opportunities, and thus will have managed her risk through a portfolio of such projects.
The programmer, on the other hand, may rely on his labor for all of his income. In the case of a failure, a bonus incentive system would result in no salary whatsoever, which would have serious consequences for him and his family. For this reason, principal-agency theory normally assumes the agent is more risk-averse than the principal. It is this difference in riskaversion that creates an efficiency requirement that is incompatible with the necessity of imposing risky incentives on the agent.
The risk-averse programmer may require more than $100,000 to compensate for being forced to take risk. For example, a risk-averse programmer may require a bonus of $130,000 to compensate for the risk he is taking. This represents a loss of profits to the owner. Does the required extra bonus represent a redistribution, or an actual efficiency loss? It turns out that it represents an actual efficiency loss. To see this, consider two schemes, one in which the owner pays a flat wage of $100,000, and one in which the owner pays a bonus of $130,00 for success. The risk-neutral (or risk-acceptant) owner prefers the flat wage because the expected payout ($100,000) is less than the expected payout of the bonus-only scheme ($104,000, since it induces a high effort by the programmer). The risk-averse agent also prefers $100,000 for sure, to the 20% possibility of a loss of $70,000 of effort with bonus-based compensation.
The principal-agent game becomes a form of a prisoners' dilemma, in which the efficient outcome is not an equilibrium, and the equilibrium is not efficient. To see this, consider the following simplified game. In Figure 1 , the principal expects the agent to respond to the flat wage with low effort; the equilibrium is therefore the incentive wage with high effort. But this is sub-optimal. Both would prefer the outcome in which the agent supplies a high effort with a flat wage of $100,000. The owner gets expected profits of $60,000, which are the highest profits out of the four shown. The employee gets a certain net benefit of $30,000, which by assumption he prefers to the uncertain $34,000 of the bonus scheme with a high effort. Both prefer a flat wage and high effort, which is nevertheless not an equilibrium outcome.
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
The backwards-induction subgame perfect equilibrium is then for the owner to commit to a bonus scheme, which induces a high effort. However, this outcome exhibits a decrease in social surplus equal to the value of the foregone efficient trade in risk. If we assume that the owner could extract all that surplus in the form of extra expected profits, then the conclusion is that the owner has to forego profits in order to induce a risk-averse agent to accept a bonus capable of inducing the high effort. This is the "agency cost" of not being able to observe the risk-averse agent's effort level directly.
The Lesson of Principal-Agency Theory
The underlying lesson of principal-agency theory, then, is a negative one. Principals may succeed in inducing effort even in the presence of an information asymmetry, but only at a personal and efficiency cost.
This efficiency loss may be sufficient to justify an abandonment of incentives in favor of paying for direct monitoring and supervision. For example, we notice that, in practice, incentive plans that are laden with risk often run into serious problems in practice. At DuPont, an incentive plan went into effect in good economic times, and it initially delivered good-sized incentive bonuses; but many employees were worried about their prospects during bad economic times, which they pointed out would be no fault of theirs. DuPont eventually had to abandon the incentive plan as they recognized the level of employee risk aversion, and the consequences of that risk aversion (1988) .
In a public bureaucracy setting, how likely is it that agency costs will be significant? In bureaucracies such as a school, a police department, or the proverbial state road crew, the effort cost of providing a routine effort (following the rules, going along with accepted norms) are likely to be small. The additional effort costs of being really committed to success (E) are likely to be extremely large. First, there is the direct effort cost: as any teacher knows, a commitment to excellence in classroom instruction is extremely costly. Beyond that, there are the social costs of being perceived as a "rate-buster" (Whyte 1955) . If a commitment to excellence calls for trying to change the way things are done in a bureaucracy, then one can be labeled a "whistleblower", and the costs associated with the stress become prohibitive for the ordinary person (Glazer & Glazer 1989) .
So E is likely to be large in many public bureaucracies. But the bonus necessary to induce these costs is a factor larger than the effort cost, because E must be divided by the probability that an individual will actually make a difference to the success of the organization.
In Missouri, third-grade teachers are judged by whether or not a certain proportion of their students pass a standardized state exam -a relatively concrete goal for public bureaucrats. In a certain elementary school in the St. Louis area, the principal regularly harangues the third-grade teachers (but not the first-grade or second-grade teachers) about the necessity of meeting that goal. The third-grade teachers, however, can only work with the students who come to them at the beginning of the year; their ability to pass the third-grade exam is largely determined by the success of the first and second grade teachers and, before that, the students' preschool experience and the commitment of the parents.
As a result, the third-grade teachers feel that (Q-P) is relatively small. As a result, E/(P-Q) is enormous. Realistically, the size of the financial bonus that would be required to make it in the self-interest of third-grade teachers to commit to a maximal effort to meet the goal must be several times the large marginal cost of maximal effort by an elementary teacher in Missouri.
Consequently, it is probably fair to say that principal-agency theory (and outcome-based incentives) provide limited help in understanding why any third-grade teacher would really commit to anything more than a routine effort, in the case where such an effort would be not directly observable. Incentives based on outcomes are insufficient to motivate high effort in situations of low individual efficacy and a high marginal cost of transcendent effort. (Akerlof 1982: 555) .
TRUST AND INCENTIVES: THE EMPIRICAL VALIDITY OF PRINCIPAL-AGENCY

The gift of the firm to the worker (in return for the worker's gift of hard work for the firm) consists in part of a wage that is fair in terms of the norms of this gift giving
In the previous section, we argue that principal-agency theory gives us little hope of understanding high effort levels on the part of risk-averse agents who feel that the marginal cost of high effort is great and their personal effect on success is low. In this section, we ask a related question: do the empirical predictions of principal-agency theory work in a controlled laboratory setting? That is, can principals and agents negotiate contracts that provide the incentive bonuses that are presumed to be necessary for success? Even more basically, are incentive bonuses necessary for high effort in the presence of information asymmetry?
In this experiment, 116 MBA students at a top-20 business school were randomly assigned to pairs in order to negotiate an employment contract. In each pair, one subject was assigned to a "principal" role, and one to an "agent." They faced parameters equal to those in the Dixit and Nalebuff problem. The contract would consist of two variables: a flat wage, and a bonus to be given to the employee in case of a success. Either variable could be zero or any positive number. The students were playing for "participation points" that would count toward their class grade, in a highly motivated environment (Kormendi and Plott 1982) . It was one of a series of such exercises that they participated in during the semester class, and in each they demonstrated a high level of intensity and commitment to earning points.
In this exercise, the points they earned were based on how much profits or net benefit they earned as owner, or programmer, respectively, as a result of the negotiation. If the program was a success, the profit earned by the owner was $200,000 less flat wage and bonus; if the program was a failure, profits were negative: the owner still had to pay whatever flat wage was promised. The programmer earned the bonus plus the flat wage less the effort cost in the case of a success; he earned only the flat wage less effort cost in case of a failure. The effort cost was $70,000 for a high effort, and $50,000 for a routine effort. At the end of the exercise, the programmer, acting alone and in secret, had a chance to select a high effort or a routine effort.
The owner never found out what choice the programmer had made.
The probability of success was 60% with a routine effort and 80% with a high effort, just as in the original Dixit and Nalebuff example. To implement this, the owner picked six numbers from one to 10; the programmer selected two more.
To determine the success of each pair, a number from one to 10 was secretly selected after the exercise was concluded. If the number was one of the 6 numbers selected by the owner, then the program was a success, regardless of the programmer's effort level; the owner got $200,000, less the flat wage and bonus paid to the programmer. If the number selected was one of the two numbers selected by the programmer, and if the programmer had selected high effort, then the program was also a success; otherwise, the program was a failure. If the number was not one of those selected by either the owner or the programmer, then the program was a failure regardless of the programmer's effort level. This operationalization captured the 60% success rate with a low effort and the 80% success rate with high effort that were promised to the subjects.
The MBA students found this a challenging exercise. They had had several previous negotiation exercises, in which they were pitted against each other in pairs in various strategic situations, and the degree of competitiveness in this exercise matched that of previous exercises, at least to the observer.
Risk Aversion
It was clear that the programmers were quite risk averse. They were concerned about providing either a routine or high effort cost, and then losing the bonus in the event that the program was not a success. This meant that they were quite concerned to negotiate a flat wage, which was a form of insurance against a program failure. However, the mean flat wage negotiated was $47,500. While this did not cover the programmers against the loss of a routine effort cost ($50,000) or a high effort cost ($70,000), it was a substantial amount of insurance. This is especially the case, since that $47,500 was a pure loss to the owners in the event of a program failure. It was also substantial considering that the flat wage had no incentive effect; it did nothing to encourage programmers to provide the unobserved high effort cost that the owner needed to guarantee a higher probability of success.
One reason that the programmers did so well in negotiating the effort cost could well be differential risk preferences. Recent research has demonstrated that negatively framed subjects are more risk acceptant than positively framed subjects in negotiation settings (Bottom 1998 ).
The owners were negatively framed, since their concern was with how much of the $200,000 potential profits they could keep. This "loss avoidance" orientation is systematically with more risk acceptant behavior. The programmers were programmed to see how much compensation they could negotiate, compared with a starting point of zero. This "gain-seeking" orientation is systematically associated with more risk aversion. Putting a risk-acceptant and a risk-averse player together, then the negotiation is no longer a constant-sum exercise: both could be made better off by shifting risk to the more risk-acceptant owner. This is precisely what happened with the large flat wages that were negotiated. From the standpoint of experimental design, this is advantageous, since principal-agency theory assumes that the owner is more risk-acceptant than the programmer. The framing of the subjects thus serves to satisfy the risk-preference assumptions of the theory.
Incentives
From the standpoint of principal-agency theory, the owner's real concern should be with the incentive bonus, not the flat wage. Negotiating a large enough bonus to increase the chance of success from 60% to 80% is essential to efficiency. The marginal effort cost of the high effort is $20,000. The extra effort cost generates an extra 20% chance of $200,000, for a marginal benefit of $40,000. Thus, efficiency requires a high effort, and (according to principal-agency theory) high effort requires a bonus of $100,000.
[Insert Table 1 about here.] In fact, the mean bonus negotiated by the MBA students was only a bit more than $70,000. This means that the average programmer, with a flat wage of $47,500 and a bonus of $70,000, earned an expected compensation of $89,500 for routine effort-well worth the trouble of a routine effort. With a routine effort, the average programmer had an expected net benefit of $39,500. But this compensation package did not create incentives for high levels of agent effort.
The average programmer would make himself worse off with a high effort.
In other words, the MBAs systematically failed to negotiate a package of financial inducements that would motivate high effort. Only fifteen pairs, or 27.6%, of the MBA students negotiated a bonus of $100,000. The failure of most pairs to shift a sufficient amount of risk to reward high effort constitutes a challenge to the empirical validity of principal-agency theory.
Of those fifteen pairs, all but one of the programmers did supply a high effort level. The effort level requirement for efficiency was met. However, there was a significant efficiency cost associated with this efficiency gain, assuming that the programmer was in fact more risk-averse than the owner, as principal-agency theory assumes and the framing of the subjects would lead us to expect. The efficiency loss was due to inefficient bearing of risk. We observe this cost in the 15 pairs of MBA students who did ensure a high effort from the programmer by shifting sufficient risk from the owner.
What Does Cooperation Look Like?
Forty-three out of the 58 pairs negotiated a bonus of less than $100,000, leaving them with no incentive to supply a high effort. Yet more than 83% of these agents supplied a high effort, despite the fact that their decision was a secret that was never revealed to their principals.
Each of these 43 agents chose a smaller over a larger expected net payoff, immediately after a round of intense, apparently self-interested negotiation. How can we make sense of this?
This result is first of all a profound challenge to principal-agency theory. A primary assumption of principal-agency theory is that incentives are necessary to get agents to act in the interests of the principal.
Nor did these programmers do so out of simple altruism. The purest altruism would have been evidenced in a willingness to work hard for zero wages. The fact is that they gave every evidence of a strong commitment to their own "financial" self-interest in the negotiations that preceded their effort decision.
One explanation is cognitive error. They do have to be able to do an expected value calculation, and to understand the concept of marginal cost and marginal benefit. However, these are topics that the students (all graduating second-year MBA students) should have covered adequately in a highly technical first-year curriculum that covered microeconomics and decisionmaking in detail. While some of the students could have been quite confused on the subject, it is unlikely that this explains the behavior of a majority of the students.
In fact, looking at the top row in Table 2 , there seems to be a kind of substitutability of flat wages for incentive bonuses, in inducing high effort levels. The group at the upper left negotiated high flat wages and significant bonuses -the latter averaging a little more than half the theoretical level that should induce high effort. The group at the upper right negotiated low flat wages and higher bonuses.
[Insert Table 2 about here.] The outcome achieved by those who first negotiated a high flat wage and then delivered a high effort level was in fact more efficient than the one predicted by principal-agency theory.
The programmers, "insured" by compensation that was primarily in the form of a flat wage, nevertheless supplied optimal levels of effort.
We confirm these results by estimating the following equation:
Here, we estimate the likelihood of a pair's interaction resulting in routine effort (as opposed to a high effort), as a function of both the flat wage and bonus set. Clearly, the revealed likelihood of routine effort in this game is low, suggesting that most pairs resulted in high effort regardless of the "flat wage-bonus" combination of incentives. We account for the relative paucity of routine effort in this binary dependent variable by estimating this model as a logit specification, with the bias corrections suggested by King and Zeger (forthcoming); this method also holds power in small sample environments and includes robust variance calculations. Table 3 provides the results for this model. This model provides no evidence for a direct role for either a flat wage or a bonus in increasing the likelihood of a routine effort on the part of the programmer. While the signs are in the correct direction (increasing either the flat wage or the bonus is expected to decrease the likelihood of a routine effort), both effects fail to attain conventional significance levels. In fact, the computed probability (absolute risk) of seeing a routine effort is smaller (0.131) given the covariates than is its incidence in the sample (0.138) unconditional on any covariates. In fact, the 95% confidence interval for this probability is 0.059 and 0.275, indicating that 97.5% of the estimated distribution lies below a 0.275 chance of routine effort. Together these results call into question the critical claim of principal-agency: that routine effort is the norm unless incentives are employed. In this experiment, incentives were not causal and high effort was the norm.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
RECIPROCITY IN PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS
A considerable part of our morality and our lives themselves are still permeated with this same atmosphere of the gift, where obligation and liberty intermingle (Mauss 1950, 65 ).
Let us repeat; the results could not be more of a challenge to principal-agency theory.
The message of principal-agency theory is that incentives are necessary to induce costly effort from agents in a context of information asymmetry. But in these experiments, self-interested risk-averse agents supplied efficient levels despite the absence of the "minimal necessary" level of incentives. As surprising as these results are, they turn out to be quite consistent with a different experimental literature on reciprocity and trust.
Reciprocal Gift Exchange
An increasingly persuasive model of how social motivation can resolve inefficiencies (including those of the principal-agent game) is a model of reciprocity, or gift exchange (Akerlof 1982 ; for its most mathematically developed form, see Rabin 1993 ). In this model, people are assumed to respond to kindness with kindness, and to harmful act with revenge.
Evidence for reciprocity as a motivator of human behavior is widespread. In anthropology, reciprocity is seen as a norm in many cultures. In hunter-gatherer cultures, much like those humans must have evolved in for 100,000 years or more, reciprocity serves as an efficient method of insurance in a risk-filled environment. A hunter may be successful only one day out of 10; but in a band of a half dozen hunters, some hunter in the band will be successful much more frequently, with more food than he can eat before it spoils. Reciprocity in sharing the results of the hunt smooths out the consumption levels for everyone in the group (Mauss 1950 ).
Experiments on Trust
Evidence for reciprocity is increasingly available from controlled laboratory experiments, as well, as ethnographic studies. One of the most compelling recent laboratory experiments speaks directly to the anomalous transcendance of principal-agency's risk-sharing/incentive trade-off. Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) ran experiments in which subjects in Room A were anonymously paired with subjects in Room B; these "partners" would remain forever unknown to each other. Subjects in Room A were given $10, and asked how much of it they would choose to send to their partners in Room B. The amount sent would be tripled by the time it reached Room B, so that each subject could potentially donate $30 to her partner. Subjects in Room B could then decide how much of the money they received from their partner would be returned to the partner. The experiment was run with a double-blind procedure that kept even the experimenter from being able to identify the decisions of any one subject.
As Berg, et al note, there is one unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game: subjects in Room A give no money to subjects in Room B, and subjects in Room B return no money to subjects in room A. Yet, 30 of 32 subjects returned an average of $5.16 of their $10.00, resulting in an average payback of $4.66 by Room B.
The authors, all economists, feel that these results raise the possibility that "trust is an economic primitive" (Berg et al. 1995: 123) . They do not define trust, but we presume that the implicit definition is "the belief that another will reciprocate a beneficent act not motivated by short-term self-interest (a gift)." There is a bit of a paradox here, because once one has this belief, actions that would not be self-interested are arguably rational. For instance, if the Room A subject believes that the Room B subject will reciprocate her gift, then it is rational to make the gift. This belief on the part of the Room A subject does not explain why the Room B subject in fact acts in a way that is consistent with the belief. On the contrary, Room A's belief in Room B's trustworthiness must be grounded in past experience of trustworthiness.
Berg, et al in fact offer evidence that social history does reinforce or discourage trustworthiness. They replicated the original experiment with 28 couples who had complete reports on the decisions made by the original 32 couples -number of Room A contributors, amounts of contribution, and number and amounts of Room B responses. The median Room A contribution was identical at about $5.00, but the level of trustworthiness increased sharply -the median payback was $8. Furthermore, there was a stronger correlation between original contributions and paybacks. The Room A contribution of $5 had an average payback of $7.14 and the $10 contributions had an average payback of $13.17. "Taken together our two treatments provide a strong rejection of the subgame perfect prediction that Room A subjects will send no money" (137). Although each player was in a one-shot transaction, the social history reinforced trust and enhanced trustworthiness.
Trust in Labor Contracts
Trust experiments like Berg, et al (1995) have potentially great implications for principal-agency relationships. Some of these implications are clearly seen in the experiments by Fehr, et al (1993) .
These experiments are framed as a labor contract -an exchange of compensation for costly "effort". Fehr's experiments begin with an "employer" offering compensation along with a proposed level of effort. If the worker accepts the contract, he immediately and automatically gets the promised compensation, no matter what level of effort he actually provides. There is no opportunity for the labor buyer to get her money back, or punish the worker for shirking. In this situation, the subgame perfect equilibrium is for the worker to supply only the minimal level of effort, and for the employer to assume that she will receive only the minimum and pay accordingly. Any compensation beyond the minimum is a manifestation of "trust" in the same sense as the Berg experiment, and any effort level beyond the minimum is a manifestation of trustworthiness, in the sense of reciprocating the buyer's trust. Like Berg, Fehr, et al find that employers have enough trust to offer more than the minimal, equilibrium compensation -and workers mostly honor that trust.
On average, employers gave workers, ex ante, 42% of the surplus generated by the exchange. In response, workers chose the minimal effort level (e = 0.1) only 16% of the time.
Furthermore, there was a positive effect of the premium offered on effort supplied. This arguably demonstrated a sense of reciprocity, not altruism. That is, employees did not unilaterally do all they could to make their employers better off. Instead, they systematically adjusted their voluntary efforts on the employers' behalf in response to the level of the "gift" they had already received from the employer. It is a striking confirmation of Akerlof's "gift exchange" theory of employer/worker interactions (1982) . As argued by Akerlof, this gift exchange is significant in scale to result in involuntary unemployment -that is, employers paying wages higher than market-clearing wages, resulting excess supply of workers.
It is also striking because, like the negotiation experiments reported in this paper, the efficiency-enhancing implicit gift-exchange occurred without repeated play; and unlike the negotiation experiments reported in this paper, the efficiency improvements were achieved without discussion of any kind. The result carries over to collective action settings, in which Fehr introduces the possibility of punishment (costly for the punisher as well as the punishee).
Although normal economic assumptions would make use of the punishment a non-credible threat from the standpoint of standard game theory, the belief in reciprocity is sufficient to create nearly perfect cooperation in such settings (1999).
Security for Effort: The Canonical Gift Exchange
As Mauss emphasized in his classic anthropological study The Gift (1950) , gift exchange has a paradoxical combination of voluntarism and obligation. There is no formal, enforceable requirement of a return gift. However, the recipient experiences a social obligation: one's standing in the eyes of the donor (and others in a social group) requires a return. Thus, as Mauss acknowledges, giving a gift can be a calculated, self-interested, strategic act, designed to put the recipient in the position of returning the gift at a time and in a form that is advantageous to the original donor. In the typical "big man" societies, this strategic form of gift-giving is the highest form of political self-advancement for ambitious men. Gift-giving is calculated to create a network of obligation that will guarantee social position for the giver.
Gift exchange in principal-agent relationships can certainly have the same calculated, strategic role. To use the principal-agent negotiation as an example, the strategic principal may well refuse to negotiate an expensive $100,000 bonus for the programmer, and instead offer a smaller flat wage, which nevertheless carries with it the generous gift of financial security for the programmer -and the expectation of high effort in return.
The obligations that go with gift exchange are a perfect solution to the imperfect contracting that follows from information asymmetry. That is, since the programmer's effort level is not observable, it cannot be contracted on or enforced. But, with a gift, a high effort level can be made to be an obligation of the programmer. In light of the trust experiments of Berg, et al, Fehr, et al, and others not reviewed here (e.g., Kollock 1994) , the results of the principal-agency negotiations reported in this paper are much less surprising.
Among the MBA subjects in the principal-agent negotiation, the programmers who supplied a high effort level with a small bonus received a high flat wage. From the perspective of principal-agent theory, this flat wage should not have been effective in inducing a high effort level. After all, the flat wage was to be paid even in the event of a program failure; and the owner was never to know whether or not the programmer had supplied a high effort.
But from the perspective of the literature on reciprocity and gift exchange, however, the outcome was quite consistent with the notion that an implicit (though totally unenforceable) bargain had been struck. High effort had been traded for a high flat wage. Norms of reciprocity would require that agents who had successfully negotiated "insurance" in the form of a high flat wage would respond with high effort levels.
Just as reciprocity in Fehr, et al resulted in efficiency gains, an exchange of high effort for a flat wage resulted in efficiency gains because the reduction in risk (for the agent) compensated for the marginal effort cost, while the high effort level from the agent was worth more to the principal than the effort cost. The typical outcome therefore transcended the insurance/incentives trade-off, in a way that could not be expected without including reciprocity as a motivation for the agent.
CROWDING OUT: THE INCONSISTENCY OF COOPERATION AND CONTROL
A high wage will not elicit effective work from those who feel themselves outcasts and slaves, nor a low wage preclude it from those who feel themselves part of a community of free men (Robertson 1921: 244) .
At one level, the theme of this paper might be thought of as using principal-agency theory as a straw man. After all, taken in its most general form, the principal-agency literature is simply suggesting that the principal can contract with the agent in such a way that she (the principal) can be confident that the agent will accomplish a task that the principal has set for him. In some cases, the principal may do this by offering financial incentives closely tied to outcome. In others, the principal may do this by close monitoring individual effort levels. In still other settings, the principal may solver her problem by working to instill a sense of trust between the agent and herself. Principal-agency may be defined broadly enough to encompass all such forms of superior/subordinate relationships.
And of course, such a perspective on principal-agency theory is unanswerable -because it is empty of content. Any hierarchical relationship -more or less formally structured, more or less successful -is a principal-agent relationship. It is, after all, not difficult to explain why an altruistic agent would take costly actions that make someone else better off. Principal-agency theory, as Moe pointed out in his early explication of the theory, was an interesting problem precisely because the agent was assumed to be financially self-interested. Furthermore, the classic principal-agency theory was concerned with the efficacy of financial incentives linked to outcomes, not to effort levels. Once again, it is not hard to write a sufficiently motivating contract linked to effort if effort is costlessly observable. (The evocative phrase for this is a "boil in oil" contract-provide the specified effort level or suffer the dire consequences.) But as Holmstrom argued in his classic "Moral Hazard in Teams", the effort needed to monitor any agent with an interesting task (like managing a multi-million dollar corporation, or the Department of Defense) is prohibitively expensive (1982).
Thus, non-vacuous principal-agency theory is precisely about the use of financial incentives, linked to outcomes rather than efforts, offered to self-interested agents. Such a theory leads us inevitably to conclusions such as that one that motivated the experiments in this paper: it is necessary to trade-off efficiency in risk-sharing for efficiency in incentives. And this conclusion, while it makes a non-vacuous, empirically testable statement, is found to be empirically false.
Furthermore, principal-agency, narrowly defined, would seem therefore to be an ineffective guide to managerial behavior. An MBA student who was sufficiently trained in principal-agency theory would be led to negotiate an outcome-linked bonus of $100,000 or more, depending on the level of the agent's risk aversion. However, an MBA student, blissfully ignorant of principal-agency theory, could negotiate (as most of the students did in the negotiation experiment) a flat wage that was less costly to the principal than the equivalent risky bonus, and expect the agent to reciprocate this gift of insurance with a high (non-observable) effort level.
Put even more strongly, the principal-agency emphasis on outcome-based bonuses, forcing an unwanted risk on a risk-averse agent, may "crowd out" the kind of reciprocal giftgiving that makes the more efficient outcome possible.
The Literature on "Crowding Out"
The concept of "crowding out" can be illustrated with the example of contributing blood to a blood drive. Clearly, some people are willing to go to the pain and trouble of donating blood for no monetary gain. This is not irrational or inconsistent with the marginal analysis of standard microeconomics. These people must derive some form of intrinsic or social motivation that makes it worthwhile for them to sacrifice an hour and endure a minor amount of pain (as in Titmuss 1971) .
But the problem quickly becomes more profound when one asks whether one can increase the amount of blood that is donated by adding a financial incentive. Economics clearly has only one answer to this question. Some people with no intrinsic or social motivation should now find it worthwhile to give blood. And those who were willing to give blood for free will certainly still find it worthwhile to give blood in exchange for their original non-pecuniary motivation plus the financial incentive.
However, this may not be true (Frey 1999) . Paying some blood donors puts the transaction on a market basis, and thereby decreases the intrinsic and social motivation for donation. A potential volunteer blood donor who would give blood for free might not give blood for $10. If she finds the financial incentive inadequate, she could also feel that the $10 inducement has eliminated or diminished the social and intrinsic rewards for donation. A person who is paid for giving blood receives none of the special social status that groups typically allocate to those who make voluntary, costly contributions to group public goods. If the nonpecuniary motivation is endogenous, and a function of the pecuniary motivation, then pecuniary rewards could crowd out other motivations for giving blood (Frey 1999) . The net result could be that paying donors for their blood would elicit fewer blood donors than keeping it on a purely voluntary basis.
The hoodlum John Dillinger is supposed to have said, of robbing banks, "You can get more cooperation with a smile and a gun than you can with just a gun." But of course, that statement is false, if we think of cooperation as anything more than minimal compliance.
Producing a gun in a bank produces the good soldier Schweik syndrome -doing exactly what the gunman orders, and nothing more -and when one can do so safely, sabotaging the gunman's intent by stepping on a silent alarm.
The reasons for crowding out are not too difficult to imagine, if more difficult to prove.
As far as intrinsic motivation, the message that "If you do X, you will be rewarded with Y" sends the message that Y is pleasant, and X must be something unpleasant. Consequently, as John Nichols has argued, a plan to reward children who read books with pizzas will likely result in fat children who hate to read (1989) . Better, he argues, to offer to reward pizza-eating with books.
Similarly, financial rewards can diminish social motivation. When a donor accepts a financial reward completes an exchange and ends the sense of obligation that is felt toward someone who gives a gift.
Thus, the case can be made that in the principal-agent negotiation discussed in this paper, the flat wage and the bonus have quite different motivational features. An owner who tries to negotiate a bonus is sending the message that the owner thinks the programmer requires an outcome-linked bonus to work hard -that is, the owner expects the programmer to shirk if a sufficiently high bonus is not negotiated. Whatever size bonus is negotiated then, it does not have the nature of a gift, but of a quid pro quo, and it carries with it no social expectation of reciprocity. On the other hand, the advantage of the flat wage is precisely that both sides recognize that it has no incentive effect. A large flat wage is therefore a gift of security from the owner to the programmer, and carries with it a social obligation -one that can only be reciprocated with high effort level.
An important thing to notice about this gift exchange is that it is fragile. A negotiation which emphasizes the necessity of a high incentive bonus eliminates the sense of social obligation, and therefore crowds out the social motivation of reciprocity.
Financial incentives are thus a substitute (not a complement) for social motivation in a principal-agency relationship. The disadvantage of financial incentives is that the best that can be accomplished with financial incentives is limited by the tradeoff between efficient incentives and efficient risk-sharing. However, social motivation in the form of reciprocal gift-giving (effort for security) can achieve first-best outcomes that are unavailable through financial incentives.
RECIPROCAL GIFT-GIVING IN THE WORKPLACE
Is there evidence that the kind of reciprocity evidenced in the Berg, Fehr, and negotiated principal-agent experiments can be found in the workplace? The kind of implicit contract we are thinking of is the exchange of security for risk-averse agents in exchange for unmonitorable but valuable efforts.
As the economist Stiglitz (1987) has pointed out, many firms do in fact force employees to bear an enormous risk -the risk associated with the business cycle. When demand drops in a recession, inventories build up, and firms almost inevitably lay off employees. The employees end up bearing the risk for an outcome (a recession) for which they are in no way responsible.
As a result, employees have every reason to "work to rule" -providing the minimal effort defined by rules and supervisorial enforcement. They have no reason to provide nonmonitorable actions or suggestions that might increase productivity, hence accelerating the day when inventories will build up resulting in their own layoffs.
An exception to the rule is Lincoln Electric Company. Lincoln Electric has had a longheld policy of no layoffs during recessions, despite the fact that its line of products (including electrical generators) is especially vulnerable to business cycle effects. Furthermore, unlike other piece-rate firms, it has a policy of never reducing the piece-rate that it offers its employees, even when the employees end up being compensated far out of line with industry averages. A similar case is that of Malden Mills, where management continued to employ all workers at their Massachusetts factory during the period during which the factory was rebuilt after a devastating fire.
The net effect of these two forms of risk-bearing is a strong sense of employee loyalty and commitment that is observable in actions that go far beyond the monitorable and contractible aspects of job descriptions. Employees are noted for constant productivity improvements that are due in part to monitorable efforts but also in part to productivity tips that could not be coerced.
Security/Commitment Exchanges in Public Management
It is possible to cull similar examples from the literature on public management. In general, the managers who have inspired the most legendary levels of loyalty from subordinates are those who specifically committed to protect the employees from external risks. Those agencies that have inspired the most legendary levels of bureaucratic indolence are those where employees feel most exposed to external risks.
Robert Moses was by all accounts a demanding, even arrogant manager, driving his employees hard and expecting complete loyalty. What he offered them, in part, was his own protection: (Caro 1974, 273) .
The rewards Moses offered his men were not only power and money. If they gave him loyalty, he returned it manifold. Moses might criticize his men himself, but if an outsider tried it -even if the outsider was right, and Moses privately told his aide so -Moses would public defend him without qualification
In other words, Moses offered to bear a large amount of risk himself, in exchange for a high level of effort and commitment from his subordinates.
While the exchange of security for commitment can enhance organizational performance, the absence of such an implicit contract can detract from organizational performance. Evidently the State Department, led as it is by a transitory and often distant Secretary of State, generally leaves its Foreign Service officers feeling exposed to political risks from Congress. Members of Congress, not the least of them Joseph McCarthy, often find it politically rewarding to take the Department, and individual officials at State, to task. The result of this risk is a high level of defensive behavior, in which Foreign Service officers will do nothing that is not clearly demanded by written rules or formal hierarchical orders. Warwick (1975) provides an account of an attempt to improve State Department performance by decreasing stifling hierarchy and rules. Despite some initial indication of success, subordinates soon demanded (and got) increased cover in the form of re-instated levels of hierarchy and increasingly explicit rules. In the absence of a managerial leader who can credibly commit to protect her subordinates, riskaverse bureaucrats will revert to unproductive but safe "working to rule". Scholz provides evidence of a similar kind of reciprocity in regulatory regimes, between regulatory agencies and the firms they are charged with regulating (1984, 1991) . Regulatory agencies have a dominant strategy to engage in coercive, maximal enforcement, to which firms have every incentive to respond with minimal compliance (1991: 118) . An exchange of information and voluntary compliance for flexible enforcement from the agency can enhance the effectiveness of regulation while reducing the costs to the firm. Scholz offers evidence that there can be a payoff in terms of reduced workplace injuries from such cooperative arrangements between state-level regulatory agencies and firms. He also shows, however, that a concern for political control by political beneficiary groups can trigger a more rigid, less cooperative regulatory style. An increased reliance on coercive regulation "crowds out" any incentive for cooperation from firms; in this case, a smile and a gun induce less cooperation from regulated firms than a smile alone.
We offer one final point on public management in the context of Brehm and Gates' "principled bureaucrats" (1997) . The evidence they offer to support their argument that selection rules choose the right type of bureaucrats -and so reduce problems of moral hazard -fits with our claim. Bureaucrats may be engaging in reciprocal gift exchanges, so that one finds a confluence of civil service protections and bureaucrats working harder (doing more of what they're supposed to be doing) than expected. If so, the mechanism for obtaining bureaucratic compliance with political goals is neither the selection mechanism nor the selected agents, it is the gift exchange.
CONCLUSION
Elsewhere, Miller (2000) has relied on Holmstrom's impossibility result to argue that principal-agency theory is conceptually flawed from the start. The division of the efficiency gains generated by team production generates a moral hazard (or shirking) problem. The hierarchical resolution of this moral hazard problem only relocates the moral hazard to the hierarchical superior, whose ownership share in the residual necessarily puts her interests at odds with efficiency for the organization as a whole. Thus, the primary constitutional problem in social organizations is insulating the organization from the principal's moral hazard, not empowering the principal through the use of incentives. This paper's criticism is even more basic. Our claim is that, in the canonical principalagency setting, a number of empirical facts emerge that constitute a challenge to the validity of principal-agency theory, even in relatively simple settings where subjects reveal a high level of self-interest and agents reveal a high relative level of risk aversion. Most importantly, many negotiations result in a high flat wage and a high effort, even when the principal will never learn whether or not the agent actually provided a high effort. That is, they circumvented the trade-off between efficient risk-sharing and efficient effort that is the primary contribution of principalagency theory.
These results are consistent with a set of experiments showing that reciprocity (even in situations where contracts can not be monitored or enforced) can provide efficiency improvements in social exchange. In a setting of public bureaucracy, we may suppose that this possibility reintroduces a range of managerial considerations that are secondary or omitted altogether from principal-agency theory. Foremost might be the creation and communication of reciprocity norms, combined with the selection of public employees that are willing and able to engage such norms in a productive way.
Furthermore, the results suggest that leadership that emphasizes reciprocity with subordinates may well be more effective than a leadership style that starts from the assumption that financial incentives are the only means for motivating subordinates. The latter style of leadership will get just what it pays for, from risk-averse agents who are troubled by the burden of unwanted risk. The former style of leadership may be able to instigate a gift exchange of security for effort that leads to non-contractible levels of innovation and commitment in bureaucracy. Supplies routine effort $120,000* 100,000 -100,000 -50,000 20,000* 50,000 Supplies high effort 160,000** 100,000 -100,000 -70,000 60,000** 30,000# Offers bonus of $130,000
Supplies routine effort 120,000* 78,000* -78,000* -50,000 42,000* 28,000* Supplies high effort 160,000** 104,000** -104,000** -70,000 56,000** 34,000**# *An expected value based on a 60% probability of success with a routine effort. **An expected value based on an 80% probability of success with a high effort. # A sufficiently risk-averse agent would prefer a risk-free net gain of $30,000 to a very risky $34,000. Then both the agent and principal would be better off with a flat wage and high effort (not an equilibrium) to the equilibrium outcome (bonus and high effort). Flat wage = $50,000 Bonus = $100,000 N=1 
